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Smallpox is a disease that followed humanity for thousands of years up until 30 years
ago. It was possible to eradicate, because an effective live vaccine from crossreacting
vaccinia could be developed. Twenty years have passed since vaccinations stopped
and very few people are protected against the disease today. Variola today has
become an object of discussion due to the possibility that it can be used as a
bioweapon. Due to the number of complications that can be expected a general
vaccination is probably not possible. Research is ongoing to develop new vaccines.
Many countries are improving their capabilities to respond to a renewed threat of a
smallpox epidemic.
Clin Microbiol Infect 2002; 8: 504–509
Smallpox is a virulent, extremely infectious dis-
ease with high mortality. It afflicted humanity for
thousands of years until some 25 years ago. It is
considered to have been our worst epidemic dis-
ease so far. Survivors often suffer sequelae.
Smallpox can only infect humans and is caused
by the variola virus, a large and complicated virus
belonging to the orthopox family. An effective live
vaccine has been available for more than 200 years.
This made it possible to eradicate smallpox after a
very ambitious, global vaccination program,
financed and managed by the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO). The official eradication
announcement was made in 1980. The virus is still
kept at selected laboratories in the USA and Russia
for important research on vaccines and antivirals.
Variola bioweapons were developed in the Soviet
Union.
More than 20 years have passed since general
vaccinations were stopped. Few people are now
protected against the disease. Variola today has
become an object of discussion, as it can be used as
a bioweapon. Owing to the number of complica-
tions that can be expected, general vaccination is
probably not possible with the present vaccines,
except in an emergency. There is ongoing research
in order to develop new vaccines. Many countries
are now improving their capabilities to respond to
a renewed threat of a smallpox epidemic.
T H E S M A L L P O X D I S E A S E
Smallpox has an incubation period of between 7
and 19 days, usually around 12–14 days. After the
incubation period, the patient falls ill with sudden
high fever, body aches, headache, and general
malaise. After about 3 days, a rash appears in
the face; over the next couple of days, it spreads
to the trunk and later to the legs and arms. Over a
2-week period, the rash changes into maculae and
later vesicles, which then become opaque and
pustular, drying into crusts. A minority of cases
are struck by a rapidly progressing form of the
disease, causing hemorrhages and often death.
Bacterial infections in the vesicles may appear
and can spread to different organs, including
the skeleton and the joints. Complications, com-
mon among survivors, include severe, disfiguring
scars and blindness caused by corneal scars. The
rate of mortality is 20–30% for the more severe
form of smallpox (variola major).
A vivid description of a case was given by E. Z.
Munch af Rosenscho¨ld (1775–1840), a physician in
Lund, Sweden:
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‘The whole body from head to feet is covered
with innumerable coalescing pustules, which burn
like fire. The face is dreadfully swollen and dis-
figured, the eyes bereft of their light. The swollen,
wheezing throat exhales a rotten stench. From the
eyes tears and pus flow, from the mouth a flow of
sour saliva, from the intestines rotten excrement,
often mixed with pus and blood. The whole body
is an abscess. One cannot any longer see the
human in the diseased.’
The patient is infectious from the end of the
incubation period. The most infectious period
comprises days 7–10 after the onset of disease,
but the crusts contain infectious virus which
could cause secondary infections in later stages
of the disease. The infection is spread primarily
by aerosol from the upper respiratory tract, but
also via material from the vesicles. Smallpox
spreads easily, particularly in hospitals. It was
estimated that a smallpox patient usually
infected an average of five new cases. There
is a concern, however, that a new case could
cause as many as 10–20 new cases because of
the present susceptible population. In a detailed
analysis of earlier outbreaks, made by Gani and
Leach [1], it was determined that between
three and five persons of the present popula-
tion would be infected by each patient. When
the critical danger and efficient countermea-
sures are employed, these figures are rapidly
lowered.
H I S T O R Y
Smallpox is known to have existed in ancient
China, India, and Egypt more than 3000 years
ago. The disease came to Europe in the 8th century.
It spread to the Americas in the 16th century,
where it had fatal consequences for the indigen-
ous, unprotected population. In Sweden, the dis-
ease was mentioned for the first time at the
beginning of the 16th century, in several letters
to the current regent, Sten Sture.
It is well established that British forces used
smallpox virus as a biological weapon during
the British–French–Native American wars of
1754–1767. The British distributed blankets con-
taminated by smallpox patients, starting epi-
demics among the Native Americans [2].
The 18th century became the century of small-
pox, probably because of an increase in travel and
continuing urbanization. In Europe, more than
half a million died annually in innumerable epi-
demics.
T H E L A S T S M A L L P O X C A S E S
I N E U R O P E
The last outbreak in Sweden occurred in the spring
of 1963 [3]. A returning sailor had traveled by air
via several countries in Asia before coming to
Sweden at the end of March. He fell ill after 2
weeks, but initially was not recognized as a case of
smallpox. The first diagnosed cases were found at
the beginning of May, when the epidemic was
already in its third generation. Vaccination of
contacts was immediately started, and within sev-
eral days a mass vaccination in the area around
Stockholm was begun. Before the outbreak ended,
420 000 persons were vaccinated. Twenty-seven
persons fell ill and four died. All of these were
unvaccinated persons. The contagion spread for
seven generations before being stopped. As in
other outbreaks at this time, infection spread in
families or in hospitals, in this case about half in
each. The biggest problem was finding quarantine
for 5000 persons, who were isolated in different
periods.
The last smallpox outbreak in Europe occurred
in the former Yugoslavia in 1972. A pilgrim from
Mecca, returning to his home country, fell ill with
smallpox. He infected a number of people in
different parts of the country. They each infected
an average of 13 further persons before the out-
break could be quelled. All neighboring countries
closed their frontiers. In a few weeks, 20 million
persons had been vaccinated and 10 000 had been
isolated. At the end of the outbreak, after 9 weeks,
175 persons had fallen ill and 35 had died. This
happened in a country where almost everybody
had been vaccinated in infancy. The strategy used
was common in the final phase of the smallpox
eradication program. It started with active surveil-
lance and rapid identification of new cases. Mea-
sures such as vaccination and isolation of all
contacts were promptly taken.
V A C C I N A T I O N A N D T H E
E R A D I C A T I O N O F S M A L L P O X
Even before the year 1000, it was known that
protection from the disease would be achieved
by introducing infectious smallpox material into
a scratch in the skin. This method was later for-
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gotten, but was taken up again and used in Europe
during the 18th century. The method is called
variolation, and gives the inoculated person a local
smallpox infection in the skin, offering sufficient
protection against inhaled smallpox virus. There
is, however, a considerable risk that full smallpox
disease might develop. The virus could also
spread to other persons, infecting them with small-
pox. Because of these problems the need for a safer
method was recognized, and variolation was for-
bidden by law in some countries.
The English country doctor Edward Jenner
(1749–1823) found that milkmaids, whose hands
had been infected with cowpox in connection with
milking, were never infected in the recurrent
smallpox epidemics. In spite of strong opposition
from the medical community, Jenner ‘vaccinated’
a child with material from cowpox [4]. After some
time, he tried to infect the child with smallpox.
There was no sign of illness. Vaccination was
rapidly accepted worldwide as a method of pro-
tection against smallpox. Sweden was the first
country to legislate that smallpox vaccination must
be undertaken in all children before 2 years of age
(1816).
Variola infects only humans, and it is relatively
easy to identify infectious people. As an efficient
vaccine was available, the WHO decided in 1959 to
carry out a global eradication campaign, which
was initiated only in 1967. After massive efforts,
the last case appeared in 1977. In 1980, the small-
pox disease was declared to be globally eradicated
[5].
The present vaccine gives good protection (91–
97%) and is very stable. It even prevents a severe
case of illness if it is given within a few days after
infection. Today, most countries have not vacci-
nated against smallpox for over 20 years. A con-
siderable proportion of the population is thus
unprotected. It is estimated that persons who have
received childhood vaccination have a lifelong
protection against severe disease, but have no
protection against milder forms of disease. An
estimate is that about 15% of the population of a
country still has acceptable protection [6].
When discussing the reinstatement of smallpox
vaccination, one must bear in mind that use of the
existing vaccines was not entirely without risk.
Different vaccinia strains involved different fre-
quencies of side effects. Several complications
have been described. Vaccinia infection may
spread to eczema (eczema vaccinatum), some of
these patients showing generalized illness with
fever and swollen lymphatic glands. Immunosup-
pressed patients could be stricken by a progressing
vaccinia infection with pocks over all surfaces of
the body (vaccinia gangrenosa). This disease was
often grave, with a high mortality. The incidence
was 0.4–6.9 per million vaccinated [7,8].
Generalized vaccinia infection was usually a
rather mild illness with pustules in many loca-
tions. The pustules heal in the same way as those
following vaccination. The incidence was 140–400
cases per million vaccinated. The most common
complication was spread of the virus to adjoining
lymph nodes, with swelling and sometimes melt-
ing. There were also more severe complications in
the form of encephalitis (postvaccinial encephali-
tis). The incidence was 3.5–10 cases per million
vaccinated, with a mortality rate of 10–35%. Vac-
cinia also has the potential to spread between
people in close contact.
In France, estimates have been based on the side
effects of the vaccine in different age groups.
General vaccination in France was estimated to
cause over 20 000 complications, with more than
300 deaths [9].
The number of complications depends on the
vaccine being used and on the population being
vaccinated. Some newer attenuated strains of vac-
cinia may give much lower rates of side effects.
Most types of complications increase with the age
of the vaccinated individual, but diminish with the
number of doses given. Vaccinating adults for the
first time accounts for the largest incidence of
complications.
H O W W I L L S M A L L P O X
V A C C I N A T I O N B E U S E D T O D A Y ?
During the eradication campaign which took place
from the 1940s to the 1970s, two vaccinia strains
were mainly used: in the USA and in countries
where US-produced vaccines were employed,
New York Board of Health strain (NYCBH); and
in Europe, Lister-Elstree strains from Great Britain.
Both these strains were very effective, and it was
possible to eliminate the virus.
The epidemic following a bioterrorist attack
would probably be quite different from what we
have experienced in the endemic cases. There
would suddenly be a large number of infected
persons in the first and second generations. This
would severely tax the organizations responsible
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for the care of the sick and the isolation of the
contacts [6].
Today, the indications for vaccination are as
follows:
1. For the handling of larger amounts of vacci-
nia virus. This is customary in vaccine pro-
duction or in cultivating recombinant vaccinia
viruses.
2. As a precaution in the military. This has been
done in the US and Russian armies. In Israel,
both men and women are conscripted into the
armed forces and are routinely vaccinated.
3. As a precaution against monkeypox. This illness
exists in some African countries and causes
occasional outbreaks, but the vaccine has never
been used as a countermeasure. In laboratories
that have undertaken to diagnose poxviruses
and other contagious diseases, the personnel are
routinely vaccinated.
4. When using vaccinia as a carrier, new vaccines
against HIV and other infectious diseases are
tested. This form of vaccination is being used in
several countries in small-scale trials.
Presently, the most important aim of vaccinia
vaccination might be a fifth indication, protection
against sudden terrrorist-initiated infection and
spreading.
Active vaccine development has led to vaccinia
attenuation by molecular manipulation or by
growth in cell culture. Several vaccinia genes have
been deleted in new strains. These attenuated
vaccines give fewer side effects, as they do not
grow as fast or for so long. The infected host cells
also secrete less virus. Using diluted existing vac-
cines, and giving repeated doses of such diluted
vaccines, is another way of lessening the second-
ary effects [10].
Without naturally occurring infections, we
currently have no direct methods for testing
protection against infection and illness from
the variola virus. There are indirect methods
for studying the immunity of the patient: the
growth and healing of the pustules, resistance to
revaccination, and development of neutralizing
antibodies and cell-mediated immunity. The EU
Commission and the European Agency for the
Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA)
intend to supply the European countries with
guidance and information to enable them to
make informed choices with regard to vaccines.
Information will also be supplied to vaccine
manufacturers.
V A C C I N E A V A I L A B I L I T Y
Most countries discontinued their national vacci-
nation programs after 1980, when smallpox was
eradicated. Many countries kept stocks of the
smallpox vaccine. The stocks may consist of con-
centrated virus-containing liquids from the pus-
tules of calf skin or sheep skin. Other stocks
contain material grown in eggs or tissue culture.
These more modern methods can be better con-
trolled.
The sizes of these stocks have varied according
to different views on the risks of new epidemics
and the strategies for combating them. Some coun-
tries have stocks suffcient for vaccinating the entire
population, while others keep enough for massive
vaccinations around cases of smallpox.
The vaccine questions have acquired a new
urgency now that bioterrorism has become a plau-
sible threat. For immediate needs, present stocks
are acceptable. The USA is considered to have 6–7
million doses. For protection in the future, the USA
aims to acquire stocks sufficient for the entire
population (250 million doses) during the year
2002.
The WHO has 500 000 doses. Activities relating
to the production of more vaccine and the devel-
opment of new vaccines are reported from differ-
ent sources [11]. Many countries have started or
are planning for the renewal of their stocks.
S P E C I F I C T R E A T M E N T
Cidofovir is an antiviral drug that can inhibit
orthopox virus replication [12]. This nucleoside
analog is used for the treatment of generalized
cytomegalovirus infection, but can cause side
effects. However, despite this drawback, it may
be important in the treatment of variola infections
and vaccination complications.
Vaccinia immunoglobulins have been able to
mitigate the symptoms or have prophylactic
effects after infection. This is similar to the pro-
phylactic effects of immunoglobulins or monoclo-
nal antibodies against rabies, hepatitis A,
respiratory syncytial virus or measles. Formerly,
immunoglobulin was also used as therapy in cases
of severe vaccination complications. It is still
recommended by the WHO for use in cases of
eczema vaccinatum. It has also been used in pri-
mary vaccinations of adults. Most of these immu-
noglobulins were produced some 30 years ago and
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are now difficult to obtain. As the latest general
vaccinations were done about 20 years ago, the
present commercial preparations have very low
vaccinia antibody levels. The production of immu-
noglobulins from vaccinia-vaccinated individuals
or the production of monoclonal antibodies are
presently not commercial activities.
D I A G N O S I S A N D V E R I F I C A T I O N
O F V A R I O L A
The poxvirus family contains the largest viruses
known, and the primary diagnosis is made by
electron microscopy of pock material. Variola
gives a characteristic picture of rectangles (about
350 270 mm) with a marked inner structure. Fast
diagnostic tests based on DNA recognition are
being developed, together with sequencing meth-
ods for rapid determination of the poxvirus type.
By measuring the antibody level of the patient’s
serum, it is possible to determine the humoral
immunity and whether the patient is producing
neutralizing antibodies. Programs have been
initiated to analyze the cellular immunity against
vaccinia and variola. This has only now become
feasible with the introduction of reactive peptides.
T H E R E M A I N I N G V I R U S S T O C K S
The WHO committee for orthopox virus infections
decided that the remaining virus strains should be
destroyed in June 1999. This was not done, as the
USA, Russia and several other states consider it
important to maintain a stock of living virus. In
January 2002, the WHO decided that variola may
be kept in the USA and Russia. This decision will
be reconsidered after 3 years. The virus is consid-
ered necessary for research on efficient antiviral
treatment, for the development of efficient modern
vaccines, and for research on the interaction of this
unique virus with the human immunologic
defense mechanisms [13].
S M A L L P O X A N D T H E
S O V I E T – R U S S I A N
B I O W E A P O N S P R O G R A M
Variola was introduced into the Soviet biowea-
pons program in 1980, according to Ken Alibek, a
defector who had been the deputy manager of the
program [14]. The virus strains that had been kept
in Moscow were moved to a research establish-
ment in Koltsovo, Novosibirsk. At this institute,
and possibly also in other places, variola was
cultured in large quantities and loaded into bombs
and intercontinental missiles. According to Alibek,
Russia continues its research program on variola,
and is developing strains that are even more
aggressive than those that occur naturally. This
work is done mainly by using gene technology.
Russia has increasing difficulties in financing
these research activities. Concern has arisen that
variola and variola technology might become
available to terrorists or rogue states as a result
of Russian scientists seeking a living abroad. Sev-
eral countries have cooperation programs with
Russia in order to lessen the risk of such an
occurrence.
T E R R O R I S T A T T A C K S A N D
B I O L O G I C A L W A R F A R E W I T H
V A R I O L A
It was formerly thought that smallpox was not
very suitable for biological warfare, because it was
too infectious. An attack would entail a high risk of
a worldwide epidemic, striking even the popula-
tion of the attackers. Even if this could be protected
by rapid vaccination, the population lasting ill-will
from the entire world would discourage the use of
variola.
However, a terrorist movement or the military
command of a state could arrive at the conclusion
that an attack with variola in the USA could allow
the epidemic to remain local because of the vigor-
ous countermeasures expected. If the risk of a
worldwide epidemic seems small, an attack might
be attempted.
Terrorists generally lack the means for vaccinat-
ing large groups of people and have less oppor-
tunity to run large-scale virus cultures. It has thus
been considered far more probable that they
would prefer bacterial infectious matter such as
anthrax, which entails less risk of uncontrollable
epidemics.
On the other hand, we have now seen that
terrorists can be extremely fanatical. The attacks
on 11 September 2001 demonstrated the great
ruthlessness and considerable resources of some
terrorists. The fundamentalist ill-will toward for
the USA is another driving force and the attacks in
the USA with weapons-grade anthrax dissemi-
nated via the post have shown that terrorists can
get access to pathogens.
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It is now widely considered that the risks of
variola being used as a weapon have been under-
estimated in the past. The USA and most European
states are planning to make large-scale vaccinia
vaccinations possible at short notice.
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